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Abstract. Open development is the public, networked sharing of communication and 
information resources towards a process of positive social transformation. Open 
development likewise imposes a challenge, because new actors, practices and 
problems of inequality are introduced. Accountability at its core is meant to redress 
issues of power and inequality [1], thus offering potential to improve open 
development processes and initiatives. However, the distinct and innovative 
characteristics of open processes render some concepts of accountability inadequate. 
This article compares three purposes and perspectives on accountability for their 
relevance to open development. The purpose of which is to suggest future areas of 
research and theoretical development in this field.  
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1   Introduction 
 
This paper adopts two key ideas to frame open development which are drawn from Smith and Seward [2] and 
Reilly and Smith [3]. Open development can be defined in terms of what it is for, and how it works. In terms of 
how it works, Smith and Seward [2] outline three processes that set open development apart from other forms of 
ICT supported interaction: open consumption (e.g. using, remixing, and repurposing content), open distribution 
(e.g. sharing and republishing content) and open production (e.g. peer production). These processes explain how 
and why particular arrangements of people, technology and content offer distinct opportunities for development. 
Second, open development can be defined in terms of what it is for. Reilly and Smith [3], in accordance with Sen 
[4], argue that open development, like human development, is the expansion of freedom. However, scholars also 
emphasise that institutional structures of society play a significant role in shaping the freedom of groups and 
individuals [5, 6].  
A debate has occurred amongst scholars in this field regarding whether or not what open processes are lead 
to what open development is for. Some have argued that open processes enable radical transformations away from 
bureaucratic modes of doing development, towards freer, less exclusive arrangements [3, 7]. In contrast, other 
scholars argue that open processes replicate wider structures of power and inequality within society, which open 
processes do not influence in and of themselves [8, 9]. The middle ground is that due to the complexity and 
flexibility of open processes, a wide spectrum of outcomes occurs. Outcomes are therefore contingent on a variety 
of contextual factors. Thus, there is a need to differentiate how and why certain development actors, particularly 
the poorest and most marginalised, may be positively or negatively affected.  
Accountability is a concept that can potentially be used to understand and influence whether open processes 
are having positive development effects. Accountability can be broadly seen as the tools and processes that protect 
and empower individuals’ opportunity to experience freedom [1, 10, 11].  However, what accountability means, 
and how it operates has not been explored within open development in detail. Much of the discourse on 
accountability in open development has focused on making use of new technology to hold development actors, 
such as governments, to account. ICT tools created to collect feedback directly from citizens can change 
accountability relationships, such that new channels between development aid recipients and the institutions 
serving them have been created [12]. Governments making public data available for free, hope to deliver greater 
transparency and accountability towards citizens [13, 14]. However, the links between accountability and open 
development are far more pervasive.  
Yet, accountability is a contested concept, and there is no set of accountability concepts that apply 
universally. This paper addresses a gap in the literature by outlining three purposes and three groups of concepts 
of accountability, through a review of the literature, which seem pertinent to explore further in the area of open 
development. I provide suggestions regarding the types of concepts and purposes as a means to begin discussions, 
and to develop a future research agenda in this area.  
2   Comparing Accountability Concepts for Open Development 
   
Accountability, like open development, has also been theorised as both processes and outcomes [15-17]. I begin 
by outlining three purposes of accountability, which aid in differentiating potential applications of accountability 
to open development. These draw out the justification for focusing the conceptual review of accountability 
according to three themes: relationship-based concepts, practice and actor-based concepts, and normative or tool-
based concepts. The subsections go into more detail regarding these themes of accountability concepts, and 
analyse them for their suitability for open development. 
A fundamental debate in accountability literature centres on the role of individuals in governing their 
own lives [18, 19]. When people are directly involved in governing aspects of their lives, they are more likely to 
make choices that suit their own needs [18]. However, Cooke and Kothari’s [20] argue that instrumentalising 
participation has a detrimental effect. This is especially true when people have limited opportunity to make 
decisions about how and why they contribute and/or benefit. Ebrahim [15] therefore posited that higher levels of 
participation, where individuals have full decision-making power and control over their actions constitutes greater 
accountability. Likewise, when individuals have fewer options to choose how to participate, accountability is 
weakened. There is a parallel between this proposition and the technical design of open processes, because there 
are usually no imposed restrictions on who or how people contribute. Thus, the assumption is that individuals 
have the opportunity to govern how they use and benefit from their participation in open processes. However, in 
practice, empirical research has demonstrated that poor and marginalised people face many structural barriers that 
inhibit their participation in open processes [21]. Hence, it is worthwhile to explore additional purposes of 
accountability for open development.  
 Alternatively, responsiveness is a form of accountability that considers the perspectives of individuals 
and groups in need first and foremost [22]. Politicians are presumably re-elected when they listen and respond to 
the needs of their constituents [23](perhaps a false truth these days!). The same principle holds true for actors and 
roles across different kinds of institutions. Empirical research has focused on analysing how responsiveness is 
enacted in private, public and third sector institutions [24-26]. However, open processes can be enacted across 
institutions, having variable levels of consistency and structure. This characteristic poses a problem to use 
responsiveness as the primary basis of accountability within open development. For example, a high level of 
responsiveness might seem realistic for a teacher using or producing open educational resources for one 
classroom, but once those resources are released for public consumption the teacher might not have close 
relationships with external users of the content. Likewise, a teacher facilitating a Massive Open Online Course 
serving thousands of individuals is not likely going to be able to respond to all learners. In this case, it may be 
necessary to explore both tools and processes for responsiveness. For instance, a survey tool to collect and 
consolidate feedback could help her to respond to groups of needs. In general, the major concern with 
responsiveness is that it fails to differentiate between active and passive actors. Active actors may not be ideally 
positioned to respond to passive actors. For example, open source software developers might not be in a position 
to understand the needs of passive users of their software. This implies a need to consider the role of actors and 
institutions who have obligations towards passive actors.  
 The last framing of accountability discussed is therefore obligation. Obligation refers to the normative 
and contractual terms of accountability and potential sanctions [1]. This includes legal and regulatory frameworks 
that outline clear institutional rules and expectations for open development. Obligation also refers to actors’ duty, 
which is contingent on roles, formal and felt responsibilities, identities and relationships [27]. For instance, 
Handlykken [28] examined the impact of a government policy to adopt open source software, which has shown 
little effect in practice. There has also been a wealth of research on opening up government data, and instituting 
strategies to garner meaningful use of this data [29-31]. In particular, Gigler et al. [12] reported that new citizen 
feedback channels changed obligations of traditional development actors. Another example, Uber, a ride-sharing 
platform, came under fire in Pakistan for the corrupt practices of rental car agencies who use the platform to 
exploit cheap illiterate workers [32]. However, understanding, shaping and/or regulating the obligations of actors 
in certain circumstances within open processes is a nascent area. Moreover, in many instances, obligations may 
not need regulating or shaping, as most open processes may never grow to the scale of Uber or government. Yet, 
as Forte and Lampe [33] argued, open systems tend to have emergent social structures which shape obligations. 
This can also be problematic for open development when certain groups of people may tend to dominate and 
render the system highly unequal. This is why there is also a need to contemplate obligations in terms of individual 
responsibilities, and how people may come to develop obligations towards others and to their role within open 
processes.  
 In summary, the table below outlines key concerns according to three accountability purposes in open 
development. The questions in Table 1 are only meant to help to differentiate how accountability purposes and 
concerns might change across purposes and types of open processes. Whilst I do not attempt to answer each 
question specifically in the remainder of this paper due to length requirements and scope of this discussion, these 
questions framed my engagement with the three themes of accountability concepts in the remainder of the paper. 
I turn now to explore three groups of accountability concepts for their relevance to understand and influence the 
relationship between what open development is and what it is for.  
 
Table 1Key Accountability Concerns Across Purposes of Accountability and Open Processes 
 Participation Responsiveness Obligation 
Open consumption 
•   Using 
•   Revising 
•   Remixing 
1)   Do people apply, not 
only access 
resources?  
2)   Can people choose 
how to participate? 
3)   Do resources 
respond to needs?  
 
4)   Are the needs of 




5)   What are the 
conditions for 






6)   What roles, 
identities and 
responsibilities do 
actors have and 
experience? 
 





8)   What liabilities and 
sanctions will actors 
be subjected to if 
they do not uphold 
their duties? 
Open distribution 
•   Sharing 
•   Republishing 
1), 2) and 
 
9)   Are distribution 
platforms accessible 
and appropriate? 
3), 4) and 
 
10)  Does the distribution 
platform respond to 




•   Peer production 
•   Crowdsourcing 
1), 2) and 
 
11)  Do people have the 
skills and 
opportunity to 
contribute in the 
ways they see fit? 
3), 4) and 
 
12)  Does the production 
process deliver the 
required resources at 
an acceptable 
quality standard and 
timeframe? 
 
2.1   Relationship-based Concepts 
Relationship-based theories of accountability tend to focus on what actors are owed by those responsible for 
fulfilling agreed upon commitments. Agency theory focuses on the principal-agent model such that a principal 
brokers a deal with an agent to deliver an artefact. Actors may have tangential interests than what the principal 
has asked for, and thus agents have an incentive to avoid accomplishing what was mutually agreed, and or to 
selectively share or hide information [34, 35]. Principals have an incentive to control known problems as a means 
to protect their brokered deal from known negative influences [34]. This accountability concept is highly 
transactional in nature because it emphasises conditions imposed on relationships to ensure that each actor is held 
to account, and that sanctions can be applied when actors do not fulfill their obligations.  
This concept could be useful to understand how open development works because it assumes that actors are 
motivated by individual interest. Within open distribution and consumption processes, the underlying premise is 
that people are free to use resources in ways they see fit, which ignores the underlying interests of open 
distributors. Agency theory implies that open consumers (agents) have privileged information over their actions 
with these resources, whilst open distributors (principals) have authority over the provision of them. Principals 
may seek methods to control how resources are used to suit their own interests. Based on this notion, this theory 
might aid in researching all three accountability purposes as the interests of authoritative actors may skew 
participation, responsiveness, and their perceived obligations. A weakness of this theory is that relationships 
between actors, may be ambiguous, especially when there are many distributors involved. It is best used when 
there are well-established actors and relationships, as with Murillo’s [13] application of this theory to open 
government initiatives in Latin American countries. Similarly, within open production processes, this theory may 
not be informative for highly decentralised open production processes and communities, especially when 
membership is in flux. A task-based scale may be the most appropriate application, as this theory might inform 
on why or why not actors may be motivated to contribute to a specific task.   
In contrast, development scholars contextualised the principal-agent model to address the more realistic 
situation when actors have multiple accountabilities, not only between one principal and an agent [36, 37]. The 
idea is to identify multiple accountabilities across relationships in order to assess how actors prioritise certain 
accountability relationships over others. These relational concepts of accountability are more focused on 
determining power asymmetries between the actors, and how power influences the actors’ choices to uphold their 
commitments. Whilst relational concepts of accountability are more realistic in development contexts and 
processes, as they can identify key pitfalls to watch out for, it is still problematic within cases where the actors 
are not well-known, or directly related, making it ambiguous to apply. Nevertheless, relational concepts draw 
attention to the need to recognise multiple relationships and how and why accountabilities are prioritised. These 
concepts seem to offer significant value for targeted analysis of specific relationships within open processes. 
However, identifying which relationships to study may be problematic. The next group offers insight into how 
relevant actors might be targeted.   
 
2.2   Practice- or Actor-Based Concepts 
The second group of concepts emphasises the contextual and situated nature of accountability. Theories within 
this group operate on the assumption that accountability is intertwined with its context, and are inseparable from 
other aspects of purposeful action [16, 38]. This means that theorists have focused on practices of accountability 
in certain settings, like organisations, public or educational institutions. Examining the practice perspective 
enables understanding how actors and organisations enact accountability, and the tools and procedures they make 
use of. Practice-based perspectives also shed light on the resultant structures and dynamics of accountability, thus 
dealing with complexity of relationships and multiple accountabilities. However, these concepts do not provide a 
means for comparing alternatives or understanding whether one way of doing is better than another [39]. 
Therefore, these concepts are advantageous for understanding how accountability functions in new, under-
explored open processes and settings.  
This perspective is particularly relevant for understanding accountability in new and innovative open 
processes. For instance, accountability in open production communities, many of which are self-organised and 
highly decentralised, is likely to be distinct from the institutional contexts mentioned above. Practice-based 
notions of accountability may also help organisations inform their understanding of how new open methods of 
working interact with existing practice. For example, many aid institutions have established funding programmes, 
institutional policies and procedures around the ethos of sharing their knowledge resources in open formats. This 
brought about new institutional contexts emphasising freedom and inclusion, but may also have knock-on effects 
in complementary aspects of its development work.   
 In a similar vein, researchers have also focused on the roles and identities of actors to frame 
accountability, and how these are constructed in context. Bovens [27] argued that actors experience five types of 
responsibilities which influence their contributions to accountability: 1) hierarchical responsibility (loyalty to 
superiors); 2) personal responsibility (relating to conscience and personal ethics); 3) social responsibility (relating 
to social norms and peers); 4) professional responsibility (profession and professional ethics); 5) civic (citizen and 
civic values). These dimensions seem particularly pertinent to organise an exploratory study of accountability in 
open processes because of the way that open processes involve multiple actors and contexts. For instance, the 
tendency to assume that open distribution models, like open government data initiatives, can be replicated and 
transported across contexts fails to acknowledge how people and institutions are shaped by different values, ethics 
and obligations. Actor-based concepts highlight the importance of understanding multiple perspectives within 
open processes. These concepts may also aid in exploring roles and responsibilities of new actors that have entered 
traditional development practice spheres. However, these concepts likewise have difficulty to establish normative 
aspects of what actors roles and responsibilities should be.   
 
2.3   Normative or Tool-based Concepts 
Normative or tool-based concepts refer to objective standards and processes to oversee and entrench aspects of 
accountability. It is unlikely that an overarching accountability framework for open development is possible or 
desirable. Nevertheless, normative or tool-based concepts of accountability could be helpful under many sets of 
circumstances. To give an explanation of what types of norms or tools are possible, Bendell [40] outlines a list of 
tools such as legal and policy frameworks, elections, boards of officials, codes of conduct,  certifications, ratings, 
summative reports, monitoring and evaluation, and dialogue and participation. At face value, some of these are 
more applicable to open development than others. First, elections, boards of officials, codes of conduct and 
certification imply a highly defined regulatory area because these accountability tools would likely emerge only 
after a substantial institutional base has been established. Therefore, governments, institutions, networks, 
communities and services that persist for long periods of time might be the most pertinent to consider for these 
types of accountability tools. However, as Handlykken’s [28] discussion of open source policy implementation in 
South Africa mentioned above notes, policies do not always have the intended effects. Conceptualising 
accountability as a particular tool or normative framework, nevertheless, does enable greater cross-comparison. 
This indicates that research incorporating both practice-based and tool-based concepts might be valuable.  
 The remaining tools from the list, such as monitoring and evaluation, ratings, and dialogue are perhaps 
of wider significance at the present stage because these tools can be useful to a more heterogeneous group of 
actors and contexts. The benefit of accountability tools, such as monitoring and evaluation, is that the connections 
between what open development is and what it is for can be made explicit. For instance, Smith and Seward [2] 
state that open processes are socially-embedded, but they do not theorise the links between how open processes 
function and what they achieve. In contrast, Zheng and Stahl’s [41] critical capability approach to open 
development enables the investigation of open processes in terms of explicit outcomes related to capabilities, 
human diversity, marginalisation and inclusion. The main issue with monitoring and evaluation is that this tool 
requires that an actor has the will or obligation to apply it. In contrast, many open production communities are 
instead quite decentralised and self-organising, implying that formative evaluations may never come to light. An 
interesting application to note is Sharp’s [42]open source community heartbeat tool, which tracks and visualises 
statistics, showing how newcomers are integrated and contributing code. However, these sorts of tools have not 
been explored in depth, warranting further research on the matter.  
3   Conclusion 
 
Overall, accountability concepts are highly relevant for reducing ambiguities between what open development is, 
and what it is for. The problem is that there are still ambiguities relating to what accountability is and how and 
why it can be applied to open development. This conceptual review of three purposes of accountability and three 
groups of accountability concepts has attempted to clarify matters. In general, there is value in pursuing all three 
purposes and perspectives of accountability mentioned above for open development in four key ways. First, at 
this juncture, empirical study is warranted to understand accountability practices across open processes and 
contexts. Second, exploratory studies may also be used to test specific assumptions regarding the purposes of 
accountability. Third, deeper understandings of accountability practices may also enable researchers to engage 
more thoroughly with excluded and neglected populations of open development. Fourth, there is a lack of ideas 
and evidence relating to accountability tools and norms specific to open development.  
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